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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------------------
BRUCE MICHAEL LARNER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No.· 18065 
'MARY LYNN HILL, formerly, 
MARY LYNN LARNER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF.KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to enforce the provisions of the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 
DISPOSITION IN LQWER COURT 
The District Court found that it had jurisdiction 
to modify a Colorado Decree as to matters pertaining to the 
custody and support of Stephen Michael Larner and Julianne 
Michelle Larner. The Court also found that it had no such 
jurisdiction in the case of a third child, Joseph Scott 
Larner. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks the reversal of the Order as 
to Stephen Michael Larner and Julianne Michelle Larner and 
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asks the Court to refer the matter to the State of Colorado 
for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant (Appellant), Mary Lynn Larner Hill, 
is the custodial parent of Stephen Michael Larner, born 
March 13, 1968, and of Joseph Scott Larner, born May 29, 1972, 
under the terms of a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage entered 
by the District Court of Jefferson County, Colorado, on 
March 17, 1980.. The Plaintiff (Respondent), Michael Bruce 
Larner, is the custodial parent, under the same Decree, for 
Julianne Michelle Larner, born May 10, 1969. 
The S~paration Agreement incorporated in the Colo-
rado Decree required that the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
should exercise joint custody over the minor children, uPro-
vided, however, that until sudh time as the parties should 
agree otherwise, or until further order of this court, the 
wife shall have the physicai care, custody and control of 
Stephen Michael Larner and Joseph Scott Larner, and the hus-
band shall have the physical care, custody and control of· 
Julianne Michelle Larner 11 (R. 7, 8) . 
Joseph Scott Larner came to Utah in "early July" 
1 
of 1981 (R. 102). On July 3, 1981, the Plaintiff filed a 
1. And was to have been returned to Colorado on August 1, 
1981 (R. 102, 103). The child was still in Utah when the 
matter was heard on August 25, 1981 (R. 107). 
-2-
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Verified Complaint with the Third District Court. The Com-
plaint was signed by the Plaintiff's attorney,. Brian M. 
Barnard, on July 1, 1981 (R. 4) and.was verified by the Plain-
tiff, Bruce Michael Larner, the following day, July 2, 1981 
(R. 5). The Verified Complaint asserted that "All three 
minor children are currently residing with the Plaintiff, 
Bruce Michael Larner, in Salt Lake. City Utah 11 (R. 3). The 
Complaint demanded that the Court grant full faith and credit 
to the Colorado Decree; that it assume jurisdiction; that it 
.enter an order of temporary custody in favor of the Plaintiff, 
modify the Colorado Decree, grant custody of the children to 
the Plaintiff and terminate· child support. A.Notice of Trial 
was filed on July 10, 1981. 
On July 29, 1981, the Defendant entered a special 
appearance· and objected to.the jurisdiction of the· Utah Court. 2 
On August 19, 1981, the Plaintiff mailed a Motion for Temporary 
Order and Notice o"f Hearing (R. 30·), moving the Court to enter 
2. On July 23, 1981, before the Defendant's special appearance 
and objections to jurisdiction could be filed, Defendant's 
counsel appeared before the Law and Motion Division of the 
Third District Court, Jay E. Banks presiding, to object to 
the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated July 8, 1981. The 
Order to Show Cause was filed with the District Court on 
July 20, 1981 (R. 19) and set for hearing on the civil calen-
dar on July 23rd. The Plaintiff did not appear in support of 
his claim and the Order to Show Cause was dismissed (R. 27 28). 
-3-
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an Order granting him the· temporary custody of the three 
minor children pending a resolution of. the matter on its 
merits. 3 
On October 1, 1981, after a hearing on August 25, 
1981, and over the Defendant's objections (R. 99), ~udge 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., concluded that the two older children 
we~e residing in Utah at the time of the hearing (R. 106), 
and found that Joseph Scott Larner was residing in Colorado 
(R. 106, 107). The Court ordered that the temporary custody 
of Stephen Michael Larner be awarded to the non custodial 
parent, Bruce Michael Larner, and taken from the custodial· 
parent, Mary Lynn Hill. The ~ourt ordered that Joseph Scott 
Larner be "returned to Colorado" (R. 108) ·pending tlfurther 
proceedings 11 (R. 107) . 
On October 16, 1981, after a hearing on the Defend-
ant's Objections to Jurisdiction on October 1, 1981, the. 
Court entered an Order holding it had jurisdiction to modify 
the Colorado Decree, with regard to the custody and support 
of Stephen Michael Larner and Julianne Michelle Larner·. The 
Court found that it had no jurisdiction to modify the Colo-
rado Decree in the case of Joseph Scott Larner (R. 43) . 
3. On August 4, 1981, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Hearing 
that purported to continue the Hearing on the Order to Show 
cause set for July 23, 1981, until August 25, 1981. The Order 
to Show Cause had been dismissed before the Plaintiff's Notice 
was filed. 
-4-
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The Court overruled the objections of the Defendant 
to its jurisdiction, and ordered the Defendant to file an 
Answer to the Plaintiff's Complaint within ten·days. The 
Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim and a Petition for 
an Intermediate Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT 
VIOLATED PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS. 
The Notice of the Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Temporary Custody (R. 30, 31) did not give the notice re-
quired by the provisions of 78-45c-5 u.c.-A., or by the provi-
sions of Rule 6, subsections (d) and (e), of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the Motion violated the require-
ments of Rule 4 of the Rules·of the Third District Court, ef-
fective July 1, 1981. The Notice of the Hearing was insuffi-
cient, whether the opposing party was out of state or iri, and 
the matter belonged on the trial calendar and not on the Order 
to Show Cause calendar. It was improper, under the rule, to 
raise the issue of temporary custody by means of an Order to 
Show cause. 4 The Motion for Temporary Order (R. 30) was a 
4. Rule 4 (h), 110rders to Show cause in the Domestic Rela-
tions Division may be used only for enforcement purposes, not 
modification. Any matter which will require longer than 15 
minutes for evidence and argument shall not be placed on the 
regular Order to Show Cause Calendar. Counsel must obtain a 
setting on the regular domestic trial calendar as a special 
setting from the Domestic Relations Judge for such hearings." 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Motion in place of the previously dismissed Order to Show 
Cause (R. 19), and, in effect, a Petition for the Temporary 
Modification of a Foreign Decree. 5 
When it awarded the Plaintiff the temporary custody 
of Stephen Michael Larner, on August 25, 1981, and asserted 
jurisdiction (R. 102, 106), the District Court made a precipi-
taus decision, on minimal facts, without sufficient consid-
eration. The Court ruled on the issue of temporary custody, 
asserting that it had jurisdiction to do so, before it heard 
argument on the Defendant's Objections to Jurisdiction, more 
than a month later, on October 1, 1981. No testimony was tak-
en before the Court awarded temporary custody to the Plaintiff,. 
5. The Motion did not co~ply with the Rule of Court. Rule 
4 (g) I 
"Whenever a change .or modification in the terms and 
conditions of a Decree of Divorce. is ·sought, ·the issue shall 
be rai·sed by the filing of a Petition for Modification and 
service of said petition upon the opposing party. Counsel 
shall take steps to have the matter set for hearing on the 
regular Domestic Relations trial calendar, if it can be tried 
in one-half day or less, ·or on the civil trial calendar if more 
than one-half day is required. No Petition for Modification 
shall be placed on any Order to Show Cause calendar without 
permission from the judge presiding in the Domestic Rela~ions 
Division. No request for a change or modification of a Decree 
shall be raised by way of an Order to Show Cause. Any modi-
fication issues improperly included in an Order to Show Cause 
will be sununarily stricken by the Court.u 
The Complaint of the Plaintiff (presumably the equivalent of 
a Petition for Modification), had been noticed for trial on 
December 9, 1981 (R. 18). 
-6-
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or at any time before, although the Defendant was physically 
present in the courtroom (R. 107). The preliminary ruling 
on the issue of temporary custody, before the Court heard the 
Defendant's objections to the exercise of its jurisdiction, 
was in effect a modifi~ation of the Colorado Decree. 6 · The 
Court failed to· take the time to accord the matter a factual 
hearing on the right calendar, and to render a decision after 
a hearing on the merits. 
POINT II 
THE ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT VIOLATE THE 
EXPRESS PROYJ:SIONS OF THE UTAH UNIFORM 
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT. 
The Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, sec-
tion 78-45c-15, provides as follows: 
11 (1) If a court of another state has 
made a custod decree, a .court of this state 
shall not modify that decree unless (a it 
appears to the court of this. state that the 
court which rendered the decree does not now 
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional pre-
requisites substantially in accordance with 
this. act or has declined to assume jurisdiction 
to modify the decree and (b) the court of this 
state has jurisdiction." (Emphasis supplied.) 
6. And a "custody determination" under the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act. See: In Re Custody of Bechard 
(1978 Colo App) 577 P.2d 778. (In Bechard a modification of 
visitation rights was held to be a custody determination 
under the Act.) See also: Bahr v. Golanski (1977) 80 Wis 
2d 72, 257 N.W. 2d 869. 
-7-
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The language of section 78-45c-15 (1) is mandatory. 
The legislature, which passed the Uniform Act, made it so. 
The statute, as applied to the facts in this case, provides 
that our Court shall not modify the Decree entered by the 
District Court in Jefferson County, Colorado, unless Colorado 
lacks jurisdiction, or declines to assume jurisdiction to 
modify its own decree, and unless Utah also has jurisdiction. 
While our Court does not appear to have interpreted 
the provisions of 78-45c-15, Colorado, which has the Uniform 
Act, has ruled on the provision a number of times. Colorado 
would not permit the Plaintiff to do what Judge Baldwin per-
mitted him to do in ·utah, ·if the ·circumstances of these parties 
were reversed; if Mrs. Larner lived in Utah and a Utah Decree 
had entered. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Uni-
form .Child Custody. Jurisdiction Act attempted to limit custody 
determinat'ion jurisdiction to only ~ state. The Act, it 
said, reflects a general policy in favor of the court render-
7 ing the original custody decree. 
7. See: Fry v. Ball (1975 Colo) 544 P.2d 402; Brown v. 
District Court of Denver (1976 Colo) 557 P.2d 384; Young v. 
District Court of County of Boulder (1977 Colo) 570 P.2d 
249.; Woodhouse v. District Court of Seventeenth Judicial 
Dist. (1978 Colo) 587 P.2d 1199; Re Custody of Glass (1975) 
36 Colo App 91, 537 P.2d 1092; In Re Custody of Thomas (1975) 
36 Colo App 96, 537 P.2d 1095; In Re Custody of Zumbrun 
(1978 Colo App) 592 P.2d 16. 
-8-
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The Colorado Decree was entered on March 17, 1980, 
only slightly more than one year before the Plaintiff filed 
his Complaint in these proceedings (R. 2). Colorado has jur-
isdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites that are in ac-
_ cordance with Utah's Uniform Act. The Defendant is a resident 
of the State of Colorado (R. 2). Colorado is the home state 
of Joseph Scott Larner (R. 106, 107). The 11 Family Residence" 
was located in Jefferson County, Colorado (R. 10, 11), and 
the original divorce proceedings were filed there (R. 6). 
Judge Baldwin concluded that Colorado and Utah had 
"joint jurisdiction," and said the issue involved was. one of 
11 venue. 11 The Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Barnard, agreed that 
that was so (R. 106). It would appear that the Court and 
Plaintiff's counsel misunderstood the implications of that 
conclusion insofar as it pertained to the application of the 
principles ·of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 8 
8. The dialogue is in the Record at page 100. 
uMR.. ALLRED: He has that custody in violation of the Colorado 
Court, Your Honor. The youngest child, Scott, was sent here 
on approximately July 1 ... The agreement of the parties was 
that on August 1st all of the children would return ... a request 
was made for his (Joseph Scott Larner's) return. It was never 
honored, so he is here at the present time in violation of the 
terms of his visitation agreement which is of course a viola-
tion of the Uniform Child Custody Act. Now the second •.. 
THE COURT: Are you. proceeding under the Uniform Child Custody 
~? 
MR. BARNARD: I have not pled that in my Complaint, at all, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I didn't think so. 11 (Emphasis supplied). 
-9-
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Colorado has never declined to assume jurisdiction 
to modify its own Decree, and proceedings relating to the 
custody of the children are pending there, in the District 
Co~rt for Jefferson County. The pendency of the proceedings 
in _Colorado was called to the attention of Judge Baldwin, at 
the Hearing on August 25, 1981, by Mr. Barnard (R. 102}. 
The Colorado Court has jurisdiction. That fact 
is conceded here by all of the principals, including Plain-
tiff's counsel. The Colorado Court expressly reserved the 
power to modify the Decree by further Order (R. 7, 8}. Given 
the facts in this case, the statute provides that a court of 
this state "shall not modify" .a foreign decree. 
POINT III 
THE·DEFENDANT DID NOT "VOLUNTARILY" SUBJECT 
HERSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
BY FILING AN ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM. 
·The filing of an Answer and Counterclaim (R. 49} 
was involuntary. The District Court ordered the Defendant to 
file an Answer, within ten days, and the Defendant ran the 
risk of being defaulted in the proceedings before the District 
Court, if she failed to file one. 
The Appellate Advocacy Handbook for the Utah Supreme 
Court provides that, "The effect of the granting of an inter-
locutory appeal is to stay action in the trial court that 
would be inconsistent with the appeal until the Supreme 
-10-
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Court's disposition. 11 (See page 6) Nothing, however, pe~tains 
to the period between the filing of the Petition and the 
granting of the Interlocutory Appeal. Furthermore, at that 
point in time, before the Supreme Court has determined whether 
or not ·to entertain the appeal, the matter is still squarely 
before the District Court. 
It cannot be said that because the Defendant com-
plied with an Order entered over her objections, and those of 
her counsel, that she has "voluntarily subjected" herself to 
the jurisdiction of the Third District Court. The Answer and 
Counte.rclaim is, moreover, not to be considered a matter of 
record on this appeal. That was the judgment· of this Court 
when it entered an Order on January 18, 1982, correcting the 
record on appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT VIOLATE THE 
PURPOSE AND POLICY OF THE UNIFORM CHILD 
CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT. 
The District Court's assumption of jurisdiction 
violated the general purpose provisions of 78-45c-l of the 
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and subverted the 
policy of the uniform legislation. 
The Uniform Act meant to avoid jurisdiction competition 
in matters of child custody. The Act was designed to deter 
. -11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the unilateral removal of children from one state to another, 
in order to obtain custody awards. The legislation attempted 
to avoid conflict between the courts of different states in 
matters involving child custody. 
The lower court acted in total disregard of the 
provisions of the Uniform Act, and the mandatory requirements 
of the new law were.violated with impunity .. The rulings of 
the court encouraged jurisdiction competition and created a 
judicial conflict that has not been resolved. The lower court 
failed to facilitate the enforcement of the Colorado Decree. 
It encouraged the litigation of a custody decision made in 
Colorado, by the parties,· and ratified by the Colorado Court. 
It violated the policy tha~ favors the court that rendered 
the original decree·, and extended custody determination jur-
isdiction beyond the parameters of the Act. The court failed · 
to ensure that the litigation take place where the "Family 
Reside.nee •t was, where ·all of the children and their parents 
lived together as a family, and where the family shared a 
social, educational,employment, religious and domestic history. 
The parties initially agreed on a forum, Colorado, 9 
(R. 7., 8) which was a more appropriate forum than the State 
9. For the legal implications of that agreement, see 
78-45c-7 (d). 
.-12-
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10 
of Utah was, for the resolution of the pending controversy. 
If the action of the trial court had not been enjoined by 
reason of the mandatory provisions of the Uniform Act, the 
lower court should have declined jurisdiction for reasons re-
lated to venue. See: 7B~45c-7. 
CONCLUSION 
The rulings of the lower court should be reversed. 
A reversal would obviate the necessity for further proceedings 
dealing with the same subject matter in two separate juris-
dictions. A ruling for the Defendant would save time, elimi-
nate expense, reduce inconvenience and avoid the duplication 
and retrial of the same legal and factual issues. It would 
also eliminate the jurisdictional conflict that now exists 
between the courts. 
This case raises questions pertaining to the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act that are of general ·con-
cern, and the decision may be expected to have broad applica-
tion. The facts afford the Court an opportunity to uphold 
the provisions and policy of the Uniform Act. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOEL M. ALLRED 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
500 American Savings Building 
61 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City,. Utah 84111 
10. At the time the Colorado Decree was entered, the Plaintiff 
was already a resident and a domiciliary of the State· of Utah 
(R. 7) • 
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